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BOOK REVIEWS
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. By John Hart Ely.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980. Pp. viii, 268. $15.00.
Reviewed by Judge Gilbert S. Merritt**
Democracy and Distrust,' an often funny book on a serious subject by a careful, witty and inventive scholar, seeks a single unifying
answer to the hard questions faced by federal courts from the beginning when they review the constitutionality of legislative and executive
actions: What is the justification for judicial review by life-tenured
magistrates in a system of government where the people elect their
representatives and executives? When state or federal action penalizes
particular groups-aliens, racial groups, pregnant women, homosexuals, the poor-what sources of enlightment should we look to for
guidance as we interpret the "open ended" provisions of the Constitution like the Equal Protection, Due Process, Privilege and Immunities
and Republican Form of Government clauses and the Ninth Amendment? Where should we look for the guiding principles of judicial
review in hard cases not answered by the constitutional text or the
body of precedent? How are we to avoid ad hoc, purely intuitive decisions?
Professor Ely believes there is a justification, a source of enlightenment and a means of avoiding simple intuition. He takes up and
disposes of a number of possible sources of "fundamental values"
outside the Constitution that have persuaded others-natural law, 2
moral philosophy, 3 neutral principles," tradition,' reason alone," concensus, 7 personal values.' He persuasively argues that none provides a
unifying principle or a satisfactory answer.
He also disposes of the "clause bound" theory, called "interpretivism," so dear to the hearts of ardent advocates of judicial
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
2. P. 48.
3. P. 58.
4. P. 54.
5. P. 60.
6. P. 56.
7. P. 63.
8. P. 44.
*
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restraint. 9 Ely demonstrates again, as have many others before him,
that judges cannot simply lay the text or the legislative history of a
broad constitutional provision next to the facts and extract an answer
to the case. Times, social and economic issues and expectations
change. As they change lawyers attack new issues-segregation,
legislative apportionment, burdens imposed on voting, privacy,
economic activity, speech, and association. Courts must decide what
the Constitution should sanction and what it should disallow. The
framers have woven a group of broad, somewhat shapeless concepts
into a pattern too intricate for easy answers.
Professor Ely finds the key to the justification and the limits of
judicial review in the considerations listed in the famous footnote 4 of
Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co. "
The basic idea is that the "open ended" provisions of the Constitution
authorize the federal courts (1) to keep the processes of representative
government (the executive and legislative branches of government)
equally open and fair to all and (2) to keep majoritarian institutions
from unfairly penalizing identifiable, or "discreet and insular,"
minorities whose voting power is insufficient to always insure fair
treatment by the majority. Ely says that his purpose is "the elaboration of a representation-reinforcingtheory . . . that . . . can ap-

propriately concern itself only with questions of participationand not
with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack.""
The Warren Court's legislative apportionment and First Amendment decisions are examples of controversial decisions that do not exceed these limitations, according to Professor Ely. They open the pro9.

Pp. 11-41.

10. There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth ....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types
of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see . . . on restraints upon
the dissemination of information, see . . . on interferences with political organizations, see

. . .

as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see ....

Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ...

or racial minorities ...

whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry ....
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938) (citations omitted).
11. P. 181 (emphasis added).
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cesses of majoritarian institutions to the votes and voices of citizens
whose influence would not otherwise be felt and protected from unfair
treatment. These decisions were:
fueled not by a desire on the part of the Court to vindicate particular
substantive values it had determined were important or fundamental, but
rather by a desire to ensure that the political process-which is where
such values are properly identified, weighed, and accommodated-was
open to those of all viewpoints on something approaching an equal
basis. 2
The segregation cases are classic examples of controversial decisions
that give legitimate protection to an identifiable minority whose voting
strength was insufficient to protect it from a hostile majority.
Professor Ely argues that these "representation-reinforcing,"
process-oriented values require enforcement by a non-majoritarian
judicial institution. These same values, because they provide the
justification, also provide the limits of judicial review under the
"open-ended" provisions of the Constitution. If these principles are
followed, courts will "not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics,"' 3 or any other "particular economic theory, whether paternalism .. .or laissez faire"" into the Constitution under the guise of
substantive due process or some other broad constitutional label.
Ely's attractive theory provides limits; but it also legitimizes, in a
coherent way, much controversial judicial activity that most
Americans, including most federal judges, now intuitively believe is
right. Ely's elaboration of this theory is a great addition to the
literature and the theory of constitutional adjudication. It will- shape
the thinking of students, lawyers and judges for many years to come.
Like most satisfying legal theories, however, Ely's theory does not
automatically provide an answer to hard cases. Certain questions remain: By what process are we to decide which of the multitude of
groups in a diverse, pluralistic society deserve identification as
"discrete and insular minorities"? By what processes are we to determine the kinds of legislative and administrative activity that unfairly
penalizes such groups once they are so characterized? Ely's answer to
questions at this level, the level at which most of our reasoning must
take place when we decide cases, is less satisfying than his general
political theory drawn from Carolene Products.
Defining "discreet and insular minorities" under Ely's theory is
12.
13.
14.

P. 74 (emphasis in original).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
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not easy. It requires us to analyze the degree of suspiciousness of a
particular classification. That analysis turns on a complex set of factors: the nature of the common identifying thread or characteristic
which forms the group, the stated purposes of the classification, any
unstated public purposes served by the classification, the harm imposed,
the political and economic power that the class possesses to defend itself,
present levels of hostility and past patterns of prejudice against the class
and, according to Professor Ely, the real, or subjective, motivations of
the classifier. These are the factors that courts do in fact consider, except
that the Supreme Court and other courts, state and federal, have behaved
inconsistently with respect to motivation. Some would argue that the subjective motivation of the legislator is not normally a proper subject of
judicial inquiry, and most judges for many reasons are reluctant to
speculate on this subject unless the real motivation is clearly proved and is
at odds with the stated purpose of the legislation.
The abortion cases and the exclusionary zoning cases are good examples of hard cases in which Professor Ely's theory does not fully
describe the kind of constitutional inquiry that is necessary. In both
sets of cases there are strong, traditional, substantive interests supporting the legislative classification and the social costs imposed upon a
particular group by the legislation. There are also strong, legitimate,
substantive interests opposing the legislation. In such cases Professor
Ely's theory counsels courts not to choose between the contending
political values at stake but rather to let the legislative majority prevail.
But in both cases individual legislators may have, and a few may
openly express, hostile, illegitimate motivations directed at "them", a
group of "outsiders" with whom the legislators cannot identify and
against whom the legislation is directed. Some may simply conceive of
women who choose abortion as promiscuous or sinful or they may
want to enact into law the religious doctrines of a particular church.
The majority of a city council or zoning board may be motivated by a
desire to segregate "them", blacks or the poor, into particular sections
of a community outside their own neighborhood.
When only legitimate, rational, "substantive values" are informing the minds of legislators on either side of an issue, it seems clear
that courts should not interfere. Ely is clearly right that we should not
weigh political values here. The difficulty comes when we introduce
the fact or probability that inadmissible factors are also at work and
that these considerations may have tipped the balance of "substantive
values" in favor of penalizing a particular group without much power.
In these hard cases how are federal courts to weigh the strength and effect of the irrational factors without considering in some degree the
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relative strength or weight of the'legitimate interests, the substantive
values, at stake on both sides?
Our constitutional and political structure, and our legal tradition,
by a process of evolution, has apparently come to expect federal courts
to weigh the strength of substantive social values, legislative-type
judicial
values, in that relatively narrow band of cases where careful
to a
inquiry demonstrates that strong irrational factors, harmful
exor
legislative
the
in
work
at
also
relatively powerless group, are
examfor
values,
political
ecutive decision-making process. Legitimate
life, the
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prefor
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judice.
The federal judiciary will abuse, and eventually undermine, whatand
ever trust the public has placed in its integrity, moderation
by
bounds
these
diligence as an institution if it consistently exceeds
values
weighing and choosing among substantive social and political
federal
outside this narrow band of cases. On the other hand, the
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groups have in us if we are unwilling to weigh substantive social
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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